Let's Make A Deal Part II: R.A. Dickey

Note: All discussion in this article assumes signing Dickey to a 2-year extension.


Well, if we're going to do this, we might as well go all the way. We've come too far to turn back now. And despite the fact that I am sure Dayton Moore feels like he has finally acquired that "front of the rotation" starter he wanted, he hasn't. Not by any credible measure outside of Gutchecks Per GRIT (GPGRIT) or Fairy Wishes Above Reality (well, fWAR, I guess). Which means that the Royals still need to find another pitcher if they really want to compete in 2013. It's weird what happens when you try and jump the market on mediocre starting pitching. It's just too bad that free agents won't sign here, ever since we murdered Robinson Cano's mother, fileted the skin from her bones, wore her like a suit and carried her head on a pike through the Plaza singing a tejano rendition of Al Jolston's "Mammy".

So, R.A. Dickey.

He's a hard pitcher to quantify, because of all of the things you've read about. So, I won't bother to rehash them. What is important are the numbers, and while for the two previous seasons they had been "Pretty good, I guess. I mean, he throws a knuckleball, so...", in 2012 they were "Really good, you know? I mean, despite the fact that he throws a knuckleball".

R.A. Dickey	K/9	BB/9	BABIP	ERA	FIP	xFIP
2010	5.37	2.17	0.276	2.84	3.65	3.75
2011	5.78	2.33	0.278	3.28	3.77	3.95
2012	8.86	2.08	0.275	2.73	3.27	3.27

The most interesting thing about Dickey's numbers over the last three seasons, for me anyway, aren't his sudden increase in K's last year, but his consistently low walk totals, given the nature of the "Pitch". One that has seemed in the past, by even the best to have thrown it, to come with a great deal of volatility in control and, thus, walk totals.

Not for Dickey. At least, not for the past three seasons. He's been tinkering with the Pitch for the past seven years now, but didn't really figure out how to throw it until that warm, autumn day in the glade when the ghost of Phil Niekro yadda yadda. Look, he's been a good pitcher for three straight seasons. His age doesn't matter, because of common sense reasons that you know about. You're a smart bunch (a smart, handsome-if-not-particularly-well-groomed bunch).

So what do the Royals have to offer the Metropolitans? Particularly now that the best prospect left in the system is Kyle Zimmer. Well, not much in the way of immediate help, to be honest (assuming what the Royals are trying to do in 2013 is compete. Right? That's what you're trying to do?).

Full Disclosure: For those of you with weak constitutions or excitable dispositions, every single one of those words is a link to a different photo of Jeff Francoeur, including one where his head has been Photoshopped onto Walker, Texas Ranger.

Offensively, the Royals have their own problems, punctuated by, if I remember this correctly, the entire right side of the field. And since the whole point is to acquire better starting pitching, it leaves us with two choices: bullpen arms and prospects. Given what some have speculated to be Dickey's trade value, his price might be much lower than you'd think. Then again, this is Dayton Moore, and as we've seen over the past twelve hours, he's very good at paying more for things.

Outside of David Wright, Daniel Murphy, Ike Davis and Ruben Tejada, the Metropolitans have what you could define as "needs" or, more astutely, "vacancies". And if they are wanting a major league ready player in return for Dickey, the only one I can see the Royals sending would be Lorenzo Cain. So, let's start there.
Cain still has five years of team control, plays an above-average center field and has shown flashes of hitting. He will also turn 27 near the beginning of the season and struggled to come back from injury last year. He's not going to be the key for any team, and certainly not the centerpiece of a trade, but he's a pretty good complement. However, the Royals need Cain, particularly now that they, well, you know. So, that's probably off the table, from a value-to-need standpoint but, it could be considered. So what's next?

The bullpen. They've got some expendables, given how well they performed last year, and the amount of depth there is in the system, you could easily move one of them without much effect. So, take your pick between Tim Collins, Greg Holland, Aaron Crow, and Kelvin Herrera. The Royals seem to be sold on Holland and Herrera (for good reason, seeing as how they are the two best arms in the bullpen). Crow is a "failed" starter who has improved his control over the last two seasons, managing nearly a 3:1 K/BB ratio last season over 63 innings. Tim Collins set a club record for strikeouts by a left-handed reliever with 93 K's over 69.2 IP. So, it's a toss-up, but let's say the Mets want Crow, considering his better control and history as a starter.

And now it comes down to prospects. Here, you are talking about either Yordano Ventura or Kyle Smith and someone like Calixte, Bonifacio or Cuthbert. Between Ventura and Smith, it is an argument between ceiling and floor. Ventura is further along with a higher ceiling; Smith is a year behind with a higher floor (mainly due to concerns about Ventura's frame and durability). Of the three position players, Bonifacio fills the biggest need, but since all of them are at least two seasons away from hinting at the majors, it is hard to tell what the Mets' needs will be then. Bonifacio is considered the best prospect of the three, given his age and performance, so there:

The Royals should trade RHP Aaron Crow, RHP Yordano Ventura, and OF Jorge Bonifacio to the Mets for R.A. Dickey.

Now that the Royals have committed to winning in 2013 (despite how realistic those commitments may be), they may as well pull the trigger for R.A. Dickey. The tone out of Metland is that the team and Dickey are unlikely to come to terms on an extension, and the Mets have no realistic expectation of competing for their division in 2013 (his last year under contract). If the Royals consider their window to be 2013-2015 as opposed to 2014-17, then making a move on Dickey makes sense. It won't happen. But it should.

Glass Attempts To Lower Bar on Expectations, Improve Personal Perception

"Royals owner David Glass created a stir recently in revealing $70 million to be the budgeted break-even point for the club’s 2013 payroll. Well, the financial pinch is a lot tighter than initially believed."

Bless you, Bob Dutton. Your job, as fun and interesting as being the beat writer for a baseball team seems, is not one that I would want. Not with what you have to put up with.

“I’ve always been willing to spend whatever cash we’ve generated on payroll,” Glass said, “and I’ve even been willing to subsidize it under conditions where we have an opportunity to be competitive in our division. I’ve never changed from that.”

Historically speaking, Mr. Glass, only once have the Royals been in a position to be competitive in the division under your stewardship. 2003. Which literally came out of nowhere. And, as long as we're being honest, it's kind of your fault that the team hasn't been competitive. You kept payroll under $50 million until 2007 when, thanks mostly to the signing of Gil Meche, the team broke that mythic barrier with a payroll of $67 million. You gave minimum signing bonuses to drafted players. You passed on first round talent because of your own cost restrictions. So, sorry if I don't believe you. Sure, things have gotten better lately on the amateur side of things. Which is to say, someone finally convinced you that you save money in the long run by not having to sign veterans when you can't field even a competent team with the flotsam you were trying to get by on.

Where were we? Oh yes. 2003. The last vestige of "competitive" Royals baseball. Mike Sweeney accounted for more than 25% of your payroll that year. He was paid $11 million. Other than him, you had seven other players making more than $1 million. One good week is all it takes, right? Well, that year the Royals had two. And it carried them to a record four games over .500. Competitive. And there's no way in hell you expected to compete that year. You want to know how I know? Because Carlos Febles, Mike DiFelice, Dee Brown, Mendy Lopez, and Julius Matos all saw a significant amount of playing time that year. You only had one pitcher make more than 20 starts (Darrell May, who was out of baseball two years later). Fifteen pitchers started a game that year, including Brad Voyles. Yes. That Brad Voyles.

In a sense, I guess you're not lying. If the team isn't ever in a position to compete, you don't have to shell out the money for it. But that's not to say you wouldn't. I mean, you said that you would, it just hasn't been an issue because your teams have always sucked.

"That $70 million includes far more than salaries allocated to the 25-man roster for opening day. Club officials say it encompasses the entire 40-man roster and also includes the signing bonus limits for the draft and international spending.
That reduces the break-even point for the 25-man roster – the figure generally used for comparison purposes in public discussions – to roughly $57 million. The draft and international limits under the new labor agreement comprise about $10 million."

Are the owner and the GM even communicating anymore? Or is everything that's been discussed over the last week just forty shades of bullshit? Let's recap:

• Trading Myers for Shields increases payroll starkly this year and commits them to more money next year (basically everything coming off the books when coupled with Guthrie's salary increase). If they are already over budget, how the hell are they going to swing that?

• If the rumor about offering Dempster 2/$26m are true (and possibly a third year), which corresponded with trade talks involving Shields, we're talking about adding $22m this year and $25m next season. How the hell were they going to swing that?

• And if Moore knew what his salary expectations were for next season, why did he trade for Santana when a better option would have been available for roughly the same cost? And if he didn't know what his salary expectations were, why the hell does he still have a job? How was he able to swing that?

When you factor in revenue sharing, TV revenues, and if you use the most simplistic model of average attendance multiplied by average ticket cost, you come out with a figure that far extends beyond the budget they are proposing to break even. And I haven't even mentioned that, given Glass' "soft cap" figures, it would imply that the team has operated at a loss (or, at best, break-even) for five of the last six seasons. No way would Glass have signed on for that.

No. This strikes me as the worst kind of public relations pandering. A feint to the masses, trying to set a precedent and cull good will when the team does actually extend the budget. So they can say, "Hey. Look at us. We're going all-out. We're doing what's necessary to win. Don't you love us? We're digging deep. So deep it hurts. It hurts to write those checks. But man, you know I'm doing it. I'm doing it for you. Because I want to win."

"While top club officials, present and past, affirm Glass’ contention that he doesn’t pocket an operating profit, those assertions are a stark contrast to figures published by Forbes magazine, which contend Glass made about $100 million from 2000-11.
Major League Baseball has long contended the Forbes figures, which are calculated without access to club financial statements, are wildly inaccurate."

Thanks again, Bob. I know that's the closest you can get to openly criticizing the team's statements. It's a precarious position to be in. I'm glad it's you, not me. I can walk away. That is to say, I could walk away. I won't.
But I just may.

Let's Make A Deal Part I: James Shields

I was prepared to have quite a long, complicated amount of information to use to make a valid argument regarding what the Royals should be willing to part with in order to acquire James Shields from the Rays. The truth is, it really isn't that difficult: The Royals should send Billy Butler to the Rays for James Shields.
Why it makes sense for the Royals:

• If we assume that Dayton Moore is honest in stating that the Royals can not afford to add additional payroll to improve the rotation, then a trade is the only avenue available.
• A Butler-for-Shields trade costs them only $4m more than what Butler would have cost over the next two seasons ($3m, if you include his buyout for 2015).
• While Shields and Guthrie would combine to cost the Royals $23m in 2014, their only other substantial payroll obligations would be Alex Gordon ($10m), Alcides Escobar ($3m), and a handful of newly arbitration-eligible players (Hosmer, Holland, Collins, et al).
• Trading for Shields should almost assure us that the Royals non-tender Luke Hochevar, given a plethora of cheaper options available (Odorizzi, Moscoso, Mendoza, Smith, etc.). This is an estimated savings of $4.5-$5m, money that can be rolled into a signing to fill Butler's spot in the lineup, which happens to be the easiest spot to replace. Despite the fact that you can not expect to match Butler's offensive output, the combination of Shields and a free agent hitter should provide surplus value (assuming that it isn't Yuniesky Betancourt) over just Butler.
• Shields does not come with a caveat emptor sticker on his forehead.
• Two years and $21m is relatively low-risk, particularly given the upside.
• The Royals would be committed to only one starting pitcher beyond the 2014 season, and none beyond the 2015 season.

Why it makes sense for the Rays:

• With B.J. Upton and Carlos Pena hitting free agency, combined with a series of unfortunate ineffectiveness from other players on the roster, the Rays need to upgrade their lineup.
• While not overwhelming from a salary relief standpoint, it sheds salary from a position of depth and refocuses it to a position of need while saving money over the next two seasons.
• The Rays have no in-house replacement to fill holes at first or at DH, while they do have several options to fill Shields' rotation spot. This would be a rare instance wherein a trade provides surplus value to both sides in kind.

Given the Royals' current situation, this deal makes the most sense. They can trade Butler and platoon Francoeur (or not) at DH with whomever they give Hochevar's money to (I'm looking at you, Eric Chavez) while playing Dyson and Cain in RF and CF until the Super Two deadline passes and Myers comes up. Their opening day rotation would be Shields, Santana, Guthrie, Chen, and Odorizzi, with Paulino and Duffy set to return sometime around mid-season.
Meanwhile, the Rays would be able to build their lineup around Evan Longoria, Ben Zobrist, and Billy Butler. They could re-sign Jeff Keppinger and look to bring in an outfielder (maybe they'd find Angel Pagan to their liking). Their rotation would consist of Price, Moore, Cobb, Hellickson, and a cabal of Jeff Niemann and Chris Archer.

There might be a bit of fine tuning to make this trade happen. A PTBNL here, some cash there, etc. But the genesis of the proposal works in favor of both teams. Hopefully, the Royals and Rays can get something worked out along these lines.

Should The Royals Take A Shot On Bartolo Colon In 2013?

Before you instantly dismiss the question, I have a riddle for you: How many Bartolo Colon's could you have gotten this season for one year of Bruce Chen's contract?

Many of you are aware by now that Bartolo received a radical surgery in his home country of the Dominican Republic, involving the use of stem cells injected into his arm, which has revitalized a career that went on life support in 2006 and was declared legally dead in 2009. While the controversy over the surgery has more or less subsided (for now), Bartolo continues to pitch, at age 39, and pitch effectively.
Over the past two seasons, Señor Colon has pitched 308 innings for the Yankees and Athletics, respectively. Over the course of that 308 innings, he has a K/9 rate of 6.5 and a BB/9 rate of 1.8, good for a K/BB ratio of 3.54. He's also accumulated 5.1 WAR over those innings.

Here's a list of Royals starters who have managed to match Colon in those four categories the past two seasons:
...
And now here's a list of starters who have managed to match him in at least three of those four categories:
...
Two of the four? Yeah, not so much.

Player	IP	K/9	BB/9	ERA/FIP/xFIP	WAR
Bartolo Colon	308.0	6.50	1.80	3.79/3.82/3.85	5.1
Luke Hochevar	328.1	6.11	2.80	4.93/4.34/4.17	3.8
Bruce Chen	289.1	6.07	2.58	4.60/4.55/4.64	2.6
Jeff Francis	183.0	4.48	1.92	5.13/4.31/4.32	3.1
Felipe Paulino	158.0	8.83	3.59	3.86/3.59/3.71	3.4
Danny Duffy	133.0	7.78	4.67	5.28/4.64/4.58	1.1
Luis Mendoza	108.0	5.42	3.17	4.01/4.13/4.47	1.6

*Note: Minimum 100 IP for starters only. Statistics for Paulino and Francis include time spent pitching for other teams, last year and this year, respectively.

Luke trumps him in innings, Duffy and Paulino in K/9, and if you remove Felipe's time with Colorado, he's got him on ERA, FIP, and xFIP as well. But that's it. Two of those guys are out until some time around the All-Star Break next year, one of them doesn't even pitch for the team anymore, and the other three are Luke Hochevar, Bruce Chen and Luis Mendoza.
It seems utterly ludicrous for me to even bring it up as a possibility. Yet here we are, fallen so far, so fast. The Royals are more than desperate for pitching. Going in to this off-season, the prevailing understanding is that the Royals need to sign two starting pitchers to even consider the possibility of contention in 2013. The offense is sort of there. The defense is solid to very good everywhere from home plate to the left field foul pole on over, right until you hit the 385 sign in right-center:

The answer to the riddle? 2.25. Colon is on a one-year deal for $2m, while Chen is earning $4.5m this year (and next year).
So why not make it three SP's this off-season? The risk with Colon is minimal, as his age and history should limit him to another one-year deal for 2013. The price will be negligible, as he lacks any sort of real leverage to negotiate a huge payday. And, as he has shown the past two seasons, he's been a better option than most of what the Royals have been able to push out there over the last 1 2/3 seasons. It's the kind of move small-market teams need to make, taking a measured risk with a veteran player in a year where they could theoretically contend as opposed to flinging $6 million at Betancourt and Broxton (and $22m at Chen and Francoeur).

Is Billy Butler Becoming Too Valuable To Trade?

As the pandemic of the summer malaise sweeps the Royals fanbase for the twenty-ninth time in the past twenty years, you start to look around for beacons; a light here and there guiding you towards a future on the far-flung shores of tomorrow that presumes to be the fulfillment of the promises currently adrift in the flotsam of the current season. Coupling the too-often-biannual comatic symptoms striking all of us is that there doesn't appear as if there is going to be that late-season call-up that reinvigorates your interest, if only for a week.

Myers? No. Odorizzi? Nope. Giavotella? Clearly, not going to happen. The merits of these decisions notwithstanding, they do have a residual affect on the ability of the fans to have their interest piqued wading through the doldrums of the final weeks of another lost season.

There are two things that the more ardent fan may be interested in, but will perhaps fly under the notice of the more casual fan that has long since abandoned their irrefutable admiration for Luis Mendoza.  The first of which is that the Royals' franchise record for doubles in a season is being threatened again. Although last year's pursuit was a four-horse race between Gordon, Cabrera, Francoeur, and Butler, no player was particularly close. this year the only player threatening is Alex Gordon, as Butler has taken to the unusual pursuit of trying to hit more homeruns. As it stands right now, Gordon would need to hit 16 doubles to tie Hal McRae's record of 54, plus one more to pass him. With 50 games left to play, it's entirely conceivable that he could do it. This pursuit, however, is relatively banal but serves as an encapsulation of the fact that Gordon is having yet another premiere season without much acclaim.


The more exciting pursuit is from the aforementioned Billy Butler and the fondness he is showing for depositing pitches beyond the outfield walls. He may or may not break Balboni's unreasonably low and completely attainable single-season HR record of 36 this season. In all fairness, I'm fairly comfortable saying he won't. If he finishes the month with 30 or so, then I'll change my mind. But right now, I don't think it's going to happen.

He is, however, more than likely to finish the season with 30 or more, something that hasn't been done since Jermaine Dye in 2000. Yes, twelve glorious years since a Royals player has managed to accomplish a feat that has become a fairly commonplace occurrence (373 times from 2000 to 2012), a club sporting such highly-touted members as Mike Jacobs, Eric Karros, Richie Sexson, Jeromy Burnitz, and Tony Batista. Now, this isn't to suggest that 30 HR's is some kind of mythical quest that proves the prowess of a hitter (see: all those people I just mentioned), but it's one of those benchmarks that people like to point to when it comes to player evaluation. It also happens to be the one counting stat that effects literally every other applicable counting stat (hits, runs, runs batted in, total bases, etc.).

The difference between 29 and 30 homeruns has very little to do with production and much more to do with perception, and the fact is that Billy Butler's perception around the league is going to change if/when he hits his 30th homerun and/if gets his 100th RBI.

And it raised the question, "Is Billy Butler too valuable to trade?"


Now obviously, there's no such thing as a player who can't be traded "under any circumstances". Everyone is available for the right price (or, in Francoeur's case, any price). But the gap between what Butler means to this team and the value he would bring in return may be widening to such a point where moving him becomes problematic.

I have every confidence in the world that Eric Hosmer's performance this year is an aberration. I fully expect him to become more of what we saw last year (and more) over the coming seasons. And Mike Moustakas' recent slump aside, I think he will produce at a high level as well. Combine this with the efforts of Salvador Perez, Alcides Escobar, Alex Gordon, Lorenzo Cain, Wil Myers (eventually), and whoever plays second, it shapes up to be a productive lineup in the near future. If all of those pistons are working in unison, the Royals become a vehicle that can run without the XM Satellite Radio that is Billy Butler. But the reality is that the reliability of those players is far from certain, particularly over the next two seasons, when Butler is making under $9 million a year.

		Highest OBP By Season, Since 2009 (Min. 400 Pas)
Rank	Year	Player	OBP
1	2010	Billy Butler	.388
2	2011	Alex Gordon	.376
3	2012	Alex Gordon	.372
4	2012	Billy Butler	.371
5	2009	Billy Butler	.362
6	2011	Billy Butler	.361

If you are a strict adherent to trading a player at his peak value, it doesn't get much higher from here on out for Butler. He'll be coming off a career year coupled with a team-friendly contract that can keep him under wraps until the end of 2015. It represents three discount years of a player who has consistently provided excess value who is just now hitting his peak, and the positives absolutely destroy any statements grounded in the presumption that he has no position. Combined with the implication that Kauffman's park factor inhibits a portion of his power potential and other teams may feel that he still has untapped potential.

If you have certain apprehensions regarding the expected production levels of the other members assured to be in the lineup a majority of the time over the next three seasons though, you should at least have some mild consternation at the prospect of trading away the most consistent bat in your lineup. Especially now, when it appears that he is finally unleashing the power potential that many of us assumed he had.

Awhile ago, I advocated a "wait and see" approach regarding Billy Butler, in hopes that he would improve his already exceptional offensive performance, upping his trade value further. Well, he has. And that, combined with the struggles of other members in the lineup, now have me wondering whether or not the Royals could afford to field a team without him next year (assuming it really is Our Time).

However, someone is going to have to be traded sooner or later. Butler has the 2nd-largest contract on the team and currently provides the most return without impacting the defensive side of things. In a lot of ways, he's their best trade chip available; a powerful impact bat with a friendly contract entering his prime. And for all of those same reasons, moving him may hurt a lot more than keeping him.

Eventually the Royals will have to trade him. They will have to. They will have to. The upcoming off-season might be their best shot to get a monster return for him. There's a lot of things that can happen between now and the 2014 trade deadline (The last really good chance to get a sizable return for him). Injury (DeJesus). Ineffectiveness (Francoeur, literally a dozen others). A return to the good-not-great days of 2009-2011. He's been great. And it's been fun. But it is fast becoming the time to steel ourselves against the inevitable. It's the beacon on the far-flung shore. We're just wading, biding our time.

Yin And Yang: The Cautionary Tale of the 2000 Royals

There was a dreadful amount of optimism coming into the 2000 season for the Royals. The offense had exploded the previous year under the steady-handed presence of Mike Sweeney, Jermaine Dye, Carlos Beltran, Johnny Damon, and that one guy at third base who was here and then gone and then here again. At least there's a precedent for Zack Greinke's return, eh?

In 1999, the Royals scored a then-club record 856 runs. And they did it with four starters who had an OPS+ of 90 or below. It was also the year that the Moustachioed Menace from Marion decided that he couldn't stand the lack of mustaches any longer, and with great dignity and unflappable integrity, he retired the day after his pension from Major League Baseball fully vested.

So what? What is one man weighed against the weight of the world, dignified and moustachioed as he may be? The Royals response was more along the lines of "I'll show you. I'll show you all!" or perhaps something slightly less evil. Whatever their take was on being abandoned by the Mussolini of the Midwest, they had been given a new singular purpose, to show the world that one man's glorious mustache doesn't amount to a hill of beans in this crazy world, and baseball is still played between the two white lines. And the two yellow poles. And generally there's some grass and dirt involved.

...Rosin bag.

Anyway, the '99 squad was well-stocked. Five starters OPS'd .791 or better. Four players drew at least fifty walks. Four players hit at least 36 doubles. And they were oh so young. They only had two starters over 30; the unforgettable Rey Sanchez and the guy I had completely forgotten about, Chad Krueter. In terms of AL comparison, however, the Royals were still middle-of-the-road. Their new-found affinity for runs was 7th in the AL, a field paced by the Cleveland Indians, who scored 1,009 runs that year. If you want to see a handsome roster without mustaches (if that's you're thing, I guess. Doesn't make sense to me, but whatever) that's the one for you. Six starters had an OPS+ of 111 or higher to compliment the instantly-recognizable names permeating the lineup: Thome, Manny, Alomar, Vizquel, Lofton, Justice, Baines.

But the Royals were doing their best, and a club record in runs gave everyone cause for hope headed into the 2000 season. They let Chad Krueter walk and brought in Gregg Zaun, a modified-mustache (or "goatee", as the kids say) man with a penchant for getting on base. The offense was ready to get rolling, and roll they did, good sir. Roll they did indeed.

Despite an injury to young, switch-hitting Carlos Beltran that limited him to 98 games and a .247/.309/.366 line, the offensive maelstrom of thunder and lightning more commonly referred to as "the Royals" rampaged through the AL Central, laying waste to many foes and seducing their share of fair maidens. For the second consecutive year, they scored a club-record amount of runs, demolishing the old total by a staggering twenty-three runs. Only the seraphim could comprehend what God hath wrought with a lineup so potent and poisonous.

The Royals finished 5th in the AL in runs scored, but due to an odd circumstance of other teams having, frankly, more, better players, they finished 3rd in the AL Central in runs scored. But it was happy times indeed. We had things to be happy about. The Royals were entertaining offensively.

Which is neatly and astutely counter-balanced by their 77-85 record caused mostly by the comedy of horrors that was the Royals pitching staff.

As good as the offense was, which is to say, better-than-average, to spite the rose-colored glasses at the ends of our noses, the pitching staff was awful. Dreadful. "Shithouse full of shit" would be accurate, if you prefer colloquialisms. Thank the ghosts of moustachioed ballplayers everywhere that the Texas Rangers exist in that joke of a ballpark (they led the league that year in runs allowed), and that the Detroit Tigers, for a time, were really bad as well.
You see, despite scoring all of those runs, what the 2000 Royals were really, really good at was letting the other team score, because while they were setting a club record for runs, they were also going about setting a then-club record for runs allowed, giving up 930 plated (but not necessarily moustachioed) batsmen. And the numbers are really quite staggering.

Jeff Suppan was the consummate workhorse and professional of the time, making 33 starts and posting a 103 ERA+ while logging 217 innings. He managed a superfluous 10-9 record, which I'm sure had mostly to do with his testicular fortitude, pitch-savvy, and erstwhile grit, since his rather Mendozish 5.3 K/9 and 3.5 BB/9 weren't doing him any favors. Allow me to iterate this point in a modern context: In 2000, while the Royals were at their peak offensive performance, their best starter was that decade's version of Luis Mendoza. Suppan only once had an ERA+ over 110 (in St. Louis, where pitchers go to die and be reborn) and for his career has a K/9 of 4.9

But it's probably not fair to criticize Suppan so much, particularly when there are so many other criticisms to be made. The lowest ERA (3.91) on the staff was Jose Santiago. Yes. The Jose Santiago. His 69 innings of relief work were a breath of fresh air amidst the backdrop of a harsh mid-day sun in a vast desert landscape. As he mowed down opposing hitters to the tune of 5.7 K/9, we all could rest and exhale, for we knew that Jose was on the job, and would probably only give up a run instead of two or three.

The next best one-legged man at an ass-kicking contest was the venerable Mac Suzuki, whose genial nature and 188 innings really took the pressure off of the bullpen. He was so good that the following year he bounced around to three different teams, being traded with Sal Fasano to the Rockies for Brent Mayne. Within a month, he was waived by Colorado and picked up by the Milwaukee Brewers. The Royals, however, were crushed, and they decided to schedule a "Return of the Mac" campaign in 2002, only six years after the song had reached the height of it's popularity. He pitched 21 innings and was out of Major League Baseball the following off-season.

There's literally a dozen more stories such as this. The Royals used 24 different pitchers that season, and Santiago's 3.91 ERA trumped them all. Even players such as Tim Byrdak, Brad Rigby, Doug Bochtler, and Paul Spoljaric, who pitched less than 10 innings each, all gave up at least 6 earned runs.
Outside of Suppan and Suzuki, there were five pitchers to make at least 10 starts: Brian Meadows (10), Jay Witasick (14), Chad Durbin (16), Blake Stein (17), and Dan Reichert, who made 18 starts to compliment his 26 relief outings and was third-most in innings pitched on the team with 153.1. Combined, these five pitchers threw a paltry 494.1 innings with a combined 5.44 ERA.

Also, Ricky Bottalico.

Of the 24 pitchers used in the 2000 season, 15 were out of baseball within three years, and many never pitched another day in the major leagues, for the Royals or for anyone else. And all of this to re-emphasize the point that, while having a good offense is a big part of the game, being able to get the other team out is a vital necessity. The current roster seems to be trending towards the halcyon days of yesteryear, when the Royals were setting offensive-inclined records despite having a team OPS+ of 93.

However, the recent rash of elbows going kaput is leaving a vital gap at the front lines of His Majesty's Royal Pitching Corps. While we shouldn't even begin to imagine that things will return to how they were in that sweltering, repressive, and seemingly endless summer twelve years ago, it's good for us to have a blast of hot air reminding us that things are still not as they should be, and as the offense continues to improve, the pitching has to improve along with it. Otherwise, we sit around a decade later, wondering what could have been of the great and vaunted offense that was dead last in walks but first in team batting average.
Sounds like a familiar tune already.

Billy Butler's Adjusted Approach

Over the last three seasons, Billy Butler has been the most dependable and productive hitter for the Kansas City Royals. Despite his prowess as a hitter (and owing to a pretty wicked positional adjustment as a DH), this hasn't been particularly reflected in the WAR department. Last season, Butler rated as a just-below-average designated hitter with 1.8 fWAR despite a .291/.361/.461 line. He has averaged just 2.3 WAR over the last three seasons despite amassing 140 doubles and 55 HRs with a .303/.370/.404 triple slash. Historically, he has also been a bad baserunner, and his defense isn't doing him any compliments either: together they have cost him roughly 2.5 WAR over the last three years.

All of these things have coalesced to produce what we have seen befor.e us: a very good hitter who draws a large number of walks and hits for good power, but hasn't really produced the type of hitter you typically see penciled in as the designated hitter.  This season, however, Billy Butler appears to have changed his approach at the plate, and it is paying off so far.

For the year, Butler is hitting .296/.355/.507, which so ridiculously resembles his career numbers (.297/.359/.461) it feels like he is mocking us. There have been a couple of noticeable differences this year, which is reflected in his slugging %.

On the year, he has already stroked 11 HRs and puts him on pace for 32, which would beat his previous career-high by double-digits (11, to be exact).  He has also hit 12 doubles, putting him on the path for about 35 on the season: that, curiously enough, would be 11 less than the total he has averaged over the last three seasons.

Replacing some of his doubles with home runs has given Butler a .507 SLG%, which would be a career-high if it holds up, and this change in philosophy appears to be intentional.

For his career, Butler has a BB% of 8.7. The previous three seasons he has been higher than that, drawing walks at a 9.5% clip.  On the other side, his career K% is 13.8, which is right in-line with where it was from 2009-2011. This season, however, Butler is walking slightly less (6.4%) and striking out more (17.1%). His ISO is also the highest of his career at .211, which would bump him from "Above-Average to Great" territory. 

Butler's spray chart from this year:

And Butler's spray chart over the same time last season:

Based on the information gathered on the season so far, it would seem that Butler has made the concerted effort to pull the ball more, in combination with being more aggressive in the strike zone.  So far it has paid off for him, as he is on pace to have career highs in HRs, .SLG%, wRC+, and WAR without sacrificing much in the on-base department.

(Statistical information was taken from FanGraphs and Baseball-Reference.  Charts were collected at TexasLeaguers.com)